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Performance audit: accountability and usefulness.  
The case of the Auditor General in Norway 
 
 
 
Forthcoming in “Public Administration” in 2013 
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Introduction  
In 1997, Power described a development towards an audit society. His ideas and hypotheses 
have subsequently been discussed by himself and other authors (Bowerman et al. 2000; 
Monfardini and Maravic 2012; Power 2003a; 2000; 1997; Power 2003b). The development 
towards an audit society is seen as a consequence of New Public Management (NPM). The 
NPM ‘regime’ has led to increased delegation which in turn has resulted in more use of 
audit and control mechanisms (Hood 1991). Audits and evaluations have become important 
tools for providing information about how public money is spent (Christensen et al. 2002; 
Benish and Levi-Faur 2012; Hood 1991; Johnsen et al. 2001; Ling 2007; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004; 2005; 2003a; 2000). 
 
It is often contended that performance audit impacts upon and contributes to the effectiveness, 
the efficiency and the accountability of the public sector, although we have little evidence-
based knowledge to support these claims (Bovens et al. 2008; Weets 2011). Thus far, only a 
few academic studies have been conducted in which the impact of performance audits has 
been examined (De Lancer Julnes 2006; Morin 2001; Van Loocke and Put 2011). In this 
article, I will therefore use the case of Norway to examine the influence of performance audit 
by analysing data from a survey of 353 civil servants who have experienced one or more 
performance audits. The research questions are:  
 
• To what degree do auditees perceive performance audit as helpful and to what degree 
are the reports used to hold the minister to account? 
• To what extent do auditees perceive performance audits used to hold the minister to 
account as more or less helpful? 
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• What can explain variations in the political accountability from and the helpfulness of 
the audit? 
 
In this article ‘holding to account’ is understood as the ministries obligation to answer for the 
execution of their responsibilities to Parliament (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 2007, p.241). 
Performance audit reports can be used to hold the minister accountable in various ways. This 
should lead to changes and improvements in the audited entities.  But the reports do not 
always get a lot of attention. Still they can lead to improvements if the auditees consider them 
helpful. Thus the first research question focuses both on helpfulness and accountability.  
 
The concept of ‘helpfulness’ is based on the respondents’ perception of the usefulness of the 
particular performance audit(s) they have experienced. “Helpfulness’ is different from “actual 
change’ or ‘improvement’ in the audited entities. The auditees` personal perception of the 
usefulness of the performance audit(s) is a more valid measure than their’ perception of 
“improvements’ that may require additional evidence to establish what actually took place.  
 
The auditees’ are embedded in institutions framing their experiences. The auditees’ 
perception of helpfulness and their construction of their own reality guide them in their 
choices of action. Their perceptions are filtered through cultural-cognitive “instruments’. The 
actions that follow will depend on the actors’ interpretation (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). At 
the same time research substantiates that audit results are more likely to be used if auditees 
consider them helpful (Lonsdale et al. 2011).  
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Background 
Performance audit has developed over the last 30 years (Lonsdale et al. 2011) and is 
conducted by organizations on different governmental levels, such as Supreme Audit 
Institutions  (SAIs) at the national level and local audit institutions at the regional and 
municipal levels. Performance audit is part of the state accountability apparatus and focuses 
on specific topics, such as the management of a service or the implementation of a 
programme (Keen 1999). The output of the audits constitutes reports that, in most cases, are 
sent to Parliament. The audit institutions’ mandate is to establish whether public policies, 
programmes, projects or organizations have operated with due regard to economy, efficiency, 
effectiveness and good management practice (Nutley et al 2012, Pollitt et al. 1999).  
  
Performance audit has different names in different countries (performance evaluation, value 
for money auditing, comprehensive auditing etc.) and is a contested technology. There have 
been disputes over the mandate of performance audit in several countries, pertaining to 
whether effectiveness should be included in the mandate or not. This has led to clashes with 
state or local government (Guthrie and Parker 1999; Jacobs 1998; Radcliffe 1998).  
 
Like many SAIs, the Norwegian Office of the Auditor General (NOAG) increased its’ 
importance with performance audit, but became at the same time more controversial and is 
perceived by some as a political player (Christensen et al. 2002).  Even though contested, the 
NOAG is committed to the performance audit goal of obtaining information about results and 
policy outcomes, the accountability for fairness and equity still remaining important (Arthur 
et al. 2012; Aucoin and Heintzman 2000; Behn 2001; Bovens 2007; Everett 2003).  
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The NOAG initiates most of its own audits, has an independent status and reports the results 
of its auditing and monitoring activities to the Norwegian Parliament (NOAG 2011). The 
ministries are invited to comment on the NOAG’s findings and conclusions before a report is 
sent to Parliament. Subsequently the final report, including the comments of the ministries, is 
submitted to a permanent supervisory committee in the Norwegian Parliament, established in 
1993: the Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs (the control committee), 
which then reviews it and submits recommendations to the Parliament.  
 
There are calls for additional evidence on the impact of performance audit. In a review of 
existing research on the subject, only 14 studies pertaining to state audit were found. In these 
studies, impact was primarily defined as instrumental. Instrumental impact is more short-term 
and easier to measure than conceptual and interactive impact, which is deemed harder to grasp 
since it entails more long-term consequences that might be hard to single out (Lonsdale et al. 
2011).  
 
Many of the studies on the impact of performance audit are based on the perceptions of those 
audited Morin (2001). Alwardat suggested that the auditees’ perceived utility of performance 
audit depend on their expectations, their view of the auditors expertise, the materiality of the 
auditor findings and the truth and fairness of the reports (Alwardat 2010). Several authors  
also problematized the independent role of auditors as being an obstacle to impact because 
stakeholder involvement is associated with greater utilization (Reichborn-Kjennerud and 
Johnsen 2011; Vanlandingham 2011). Justesen and Skærbek (2010) examined how 
accountability mechanisms contributed to the auditors’ impact and suggested that these are 
forceful mechanisms in making organizations implement changes. Still they questioned 
whether the changes necessarily improved matters.  Other researchers have focused on 
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learning processes from and success factors for performance audit stressing the importance of 
the compatibility of the opinions of the auditor and the auditee (De Vries et al. 2000; Van der 
Meer 1999). Lapsley and Pong (2000) based the assessment of impact on the opinion of the 
auditors themselves. There is also some research on the impact of audit institutions at the 
local level (Johnsen et al. 2001; Tillema and ter Bogt 2010; Weets 2011).  
 
Theory 
 
On the relationship between the political accountability and the helpfulness of audit 
There is a conflict inherent in the performance audit mandate. Audit institutions are supposed 
both to improve operations and to enhance accountability, the prime purpose of performance 
audit being accountability, while learning is an important secondary goal.  Still, a logical link 
between account giving and performance has not been demonstrated (Dubnick 2005; 
Funkhouser 2011; Lonsdale et al. 2011, p.315). Put (2011) states that the improvement agenda 
is clearly incompatible to demands for accountability. Accountability is based on clear norms 
whereas improvement is dependent on explanation. At the same time reports based on 
explanations might be conceived as less legitimate. This conflicting agenda creates dilemmas 
for auditors in practice (Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen 2011).  
 
According to many scholars, there is an accountability paradox: enhanced accountability can 
diminish or impede organizational performance. If audit leads to gaming and defensiveness 
and excessive caution it can discourage innovation and ignore results (Behn 2001; 
Bemelmans-Videc et al. 2007). Some authors therefore argue that the auditors need to review 
their conception of accountability in order to emphasize learning in the audited organizations 
(Behn 2001; Bovens 2007; Gendron et al. 2007; Lonsdale and Bechberger 2011; Mohan and 
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Sullivan 2006). A prerequisite for audit to contribute to learning and improvement is that it is 
oriented towards improved performance and results instead of compliance with rules. This 
should ensure better public services (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 2007). Still performance 
improvement can also occur just as a result of improved accountability (Furubo 2011).  
 
Through the use of an analytical model of characteristics and barriers associated with learning 
from evaluation (Taut and Brauns 2003), many factors were found that would obstruct 
learning, as well as a few that would enhance learning in the case of performance audit (Van 
Loocke and Put 2011). Funkhouser (2011) nevertheless argues that there are mechanisms by 
which accountability can improve performance, notably through public dialogue and 
organizational learning. An audit might reveal new facts that trigger debates and lead to a 
shift in paradigms. It might also provide new information that will lead auditees to see 
solutions in a new light. Leaders in the public sector will feel the pressure from accountability 
both from elected representatives and their superiors, and positive consequences can come of 
this in terms of prevention, increased political competition and more efficient government 
(Batac and Carassus 2009; Bovens 2005; Johnsen 2003; Mulgan 2000).  
 
The hypothesis below tests the proposition of the accountability paradox: 
 
H1: The auditees will perceive performance audit as less helpful when the reports are used to 
hold ministers accountable 
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Explanations for variations in the political accountability from and the helpfulness of the 
audit  
A rational-instrumental perspective 
The SAIs’ increased use of evaluative methods, linked to the managerial trend of NPM, 
(English 2003; Everett 2003) is based on rational-instrumental theories. These theories 
assume that actors and organizations are striving to obtain goals based on rational calculation 
of available alternatives and consequences (March and Olsen 1989). An assumption in NPM 
is that of a chain of principal and agent relations where the principal controls the agent. In this 
chain of control, the Parliament is the agent of the people and the government is the agent of 
the Parliament. The SAI serves the Parliament and has an administrative role in controlling 
public administration on its’ behalf (Lægreid 2012). To attain goals in a rational way, the SAI 
must be able to control those that are set to achieve them. Different mechanisms are at work 
here, including social influence mechanisms (Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Jørgensen 1987). 
Expert power can be classified as one such mechanism (Raven 1992)  
 
The SAIs’ auditors frame themselves as experts (Benford and Snow 2000) and are expected to 
have the competency to objectively assess the quality of data and establish certainty. The 
auditees’ perception of the SAI can therefore influence the auditees’ opinion of the 
helpfulness of their reports (Lefsrud and Meyer 2012; Porter 1995). This is measured in the 
hypothesis below.  
 
H2: Whether the audited civil servants think of the performance audit as helpful will depend 
on their perception of the SAI in contributing to transparency, improvements and prevention 
of fraud. 
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The expertise also has to be supported in the quality of their work. The hypothesis below tests 
this proposition: 
 
H3: The more positive perception the civil servants have of the quality of the performance 
audit report, the more they will think of it as helpful 
 
The SAIs have a goal of contributing to improvement in the management of public affairs. It 
expects improvement to follow from its detection of deviance from norms. The ministries are 
expected to find reports helpful in their quest for learning and improvement of operations. 
This is an implicit assumption of the Management by Objectives and Results system of the 
Norwegian public administration (Lægreid et al. 2006).  It is the ministries that are expected 
to respond to and make use of the reports. I therefore hypothesize that they find them more 
helpful than subordinate agencies (Funkhouser 2011).  
 
H4: The civil servants in the ministries will think performance audit is more helpful than will 
those working in subordinate administrative levels 
 
The auditees’ actual experience with performance audit also matters. The causal direction 
might work both ways. As the hypothesis below states, positive experiences with the 
performance audit will enhance the perception of helpfulness, but organizational learning 
might likewise take place if the report is conceived as helpful (van der Knaap 2004).  
 
H5: Experiences with performance audit enhancing systems, policies and competencies will 
increase the audited civil servants’ perception of helpfulness 
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Implicit in the control-system is its contribution to accountability. In the principal-agent 
relationship, Parliament holds the government accountable. This happens when politicians 
and the control committee use the reports to hold the minister to account. The hypotheses 
below test these propositions:  
 
H6: The more pressure from the politicians, the more the audited entities will feel that the 
minister is held accountable. 
 
H7: The more demands from the Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs, 
the more the audited entities will feel that the minister is held accountable. 
 
As it is the ministries that are addressed in the reports, and thus the principals’ subject of 
control, I would expect the latter to be more aware of the accountability dimension than 
subordinate entities: 
 
H8: Civil servants in the ministries will be more inclined to find that performance audit is 
used to hold the minister accountable than subordinate entities.  
 
Institutional theory 
Contrary to rational-instrumental theories, institutional theories base their explanations more 
on symbolic matters and appropriate conduct than on rational-instrumental theories and the 
emphasis of these on actors’ calculation of cost and benefit (March and Olsen 1989). Within 
institutional theory, an important goal of actors and organizations is their own survival and 
thus the legitimacy of their own institution. The public debate is an important arena for this 
fight over legitimacy. Changes in the audited entities will occur as a response to mimetic 
  
11
isomorphic forces (as opposed to the more coercive forces of parliamentary committees and 
politicians within the control system).  The media, interest groups and the SAI are all part of 
the audited entities’ institutionalized task environment that exerts pressure on them (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977). Bovens describes this pressure as social accountability mechanisms which 
are more horizontal and voluntary. This pressure is measured by the hypotheses below 
(Bovens 2007).  
 
H9: The more debate in the media, the more the audited entities will feel that the minister is 
held accountable. 
 
H10: The more other actors become interested, the more the audited entities will feel that the 
minister is held accountable. 
 
We know from institutional theory that cultural norms and values developed in the 
organization’s formative years will constrain action (Scott 2008). The formal and informal 
traditions in the audited entity determine what path the institution follows, and this assumes 
that reforms and changes are subjected to a “compatibility test’ (Brunsson and Olsen 1993; 
March and Olsen 1989), meaning that the proposed changes, in order to have an impact, must 
be compatible with the institutions’ own opinion about changes that need to be made as well 
as with their perception of what is appropriate. If this is not the case, the audited entity could 
be quite resistant to change (Røvik 2007). The hypothesis below tests this proposition of 
compatibility: 
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H11: The more the audited civil servants agree with the SAI’s audit criteria and the more they 
are allowed to influence the audit process, the more helpful they will find the performance 
audit 
 
Method 
This study was conducted as an independent research project. The data collection method 
adopted was that of a survey. Inquiries were sent to the public institutions that had 
experienced performance audit between 2005 and 2010. I did not go further back in time as 
respondents might have problems recollecting the performance audit or they could have 
changed their place of work. These risks increase the further back in time you go. The 
institutions that received inquiries were asked to provide the e-mail addresses of employees 
who had experienced performance audit. Inquiries were then sent to the employees explaining 
the purpose of the study and informing them of their rights. Subsequently, a web-based 
questionnaire was sent to the employees.  Reminders were sent out to respondents who had 
not answered by a certain deadline. 
The questionnaire was designed in such a way that the respondents were asked to answer 
questions pertaining to the particular performance audit(s) they themselves had experienced. 
In the questionnaire, there were questions seeking to reveal both the civil servants’ 
perceptions of performance audit and their professional backgrounds. The perception 
variables consisted of several assertions with the aim of illustrating underlying dimensions of 
perception. The questions were designed based on previous research (Morin 2004; Pollitt et 
al. 1999; Power 1997) and validated by research colleagues, ministry and agency employees 
as well as one director general and two methodology experts from the NOAG. A pilot study 
was conducted with nine respondents prior to sending out the survey in spring 2011. 
  
13
A total of 520 questionnaires were distributed. After screening out those who were unable to 
answer because of absence, sickness or who were wrongly chosen for participation, 471 valid 
e-mail addresses remained. The number of responses was 353, corresponding to a response 
rate of 74 per cent. A five category scale was selected for the survey, as well as a sixth “I 
don’t know’ category.  
One limitation of the research design might be that the point of view reported is exclusively 
that of the audited civil servants. It is not an objective assessment of the quality and 
usefulness of the performance audit, but rather an account from those affected by them. It can 
be, and has been, questioned whether asking the auditees themselves about the impact of 
performance audit is an appropriate research method. Locke and Put (2011) argue that the 
auditees’ perception does not measure actual impact, but is an intermediate factor. The 
perception of the auditees is important, however. Literature on organizational learning and the 
use of programme evaluation stresses the importance, for the use of evaluation results, of the 
relation to those evaluated. If they have positive attitudes towards evaluation and share the 
evaluators’ concept of social reality, evaluation results are more likely to be used. This can 
also be relevant for audit (Lonsdale and Bechberger 2011; Taut and Brauns 2003). It also 
matters whether those evaluated perceive control measures as controlling or supportive. 
Research shows that the experience of measures as controlling reduces performance, whereas 
the experience of measures as supportive increases performance (Andersen and Pallesen 
2008; Frey and Jegen 2001). 
A majority of the civil servants who answered the questionnaire were middle managers (54 
per cent), followed by senior civil servants (35 per cent) and then top executives (11 per cent). 
Some 60 per cent of the respondents worked in a ministry or an agency (approximately 30 per 
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cent in each). The rest worked in regional and local offices, government owned corporations, 
counties and municipalities. 
Before starting the analysis of the data, data screening was necessary. This includes cleaning 
and treating the data of outliers and missing data (Meyers et al. 2006). The “I don’t 
know’values were defined as missing in the final dataset (Allison 2002; Meyers et al. 2006; 
Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). This reduced the dataset to 336 respondents. I further reduced 
the dataset to include only the respondents that had been most closely involved in the 
performance audit process with the SAI. I did this by including only respondents who had 
answered more than 4 out of 8 questions concerning their involvement, the reasoning being 
that answering more than half of the questions concerning involvement proved them 
competent enough to be included. Thus the final dataset includes 215 expert respondents, 
amounting to 64 per cent of the total dataset.  
Thorough descriptive analysis was conducted before running factor and regression analysis. 
Bivariate correlations as well as a one-way ANOVA were also conducted. Significance levels 
were set at 0.05  
Most of the questions in the questionnaire (except the background variables) were designed to 
measure concepts pertaining to underlying dimensions of performance audit. I conducted a 
factor analysis to estimate these factorial components.  
The causal influence between the perception variables and the dependent variables could 
work both ways. The auditees might have thought of the reports as helpful because they had a 
positive perception of the NOAG and their reports, as well as the other way around. Still, it 
might be argued that the auditees’ have a preconception of the reports prior to making a 
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judgment about them. Therefore the major causal influence would presumably start with a 
certain perception and end in a judgement of the reports as useful or not.  
Independent of the causal direction, the data provides interesting evidence because it informs 
us about particular aspects of the performance audit that are possible to control. Performance 
management and evaluation literature demonstrate that the perception of the professionals is 
decisive as to whether systems and reports are actually used, and not manipulated (de Bruijn 
2002; Taut and Brauns 2003).  
Independent variables 
In the regression analysis, I used factor scores from the factor analysis as independent 
variables (see table 1). Factor scores are estimates of the values of the factorial components. 
The Chronbach alpha measure was used to check the internal reliability of these components. 
Only factors with Chronbach alpha equal to or higher than 0.70 were selected for subsequent 
analysis.  From the factor analysis I had four factors measuring underlying dimensions of 
performance audit.  
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Table 1. Factor analysis: Four independent perception variables 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
Comments regarding audit questions were sufficiently taken into account .763 .308   
Comments regarding risk assessments were sufficiently taken into account  .802    
Comments regarding OAG assessments were sufficiently taken into account .652 .452   
Comments regarding OAG interpretation of results were sufficiently taken into 
account 
.657 .410   
Comments regarding audit evidence were sufficiently taken into account .701    
Comments regarding audit criteria were sufficiently taken into account .738    
Comments regarding meeting minutes from interviews were sufficiently taken into 
account 
.577    
Agree with audit criteria .683 .304   
Agree with OAG assessments .445 .612   
The performance audit report held good quality     .384 .726   
Concrete conclusions  .788   
Clear link between audit criteria, facts and assessments      .785   
Report proved good sector expertise with the auditors     .311 .678   
Methods held scientific/good quality     .321 .645   
Increased interest to learn from best practice   .758  
Policy areas were given priority   .791  
Made changes to systems that previously did’nt work very well   .778  
The OAG promotes transparency and prevents fraud    .881 
The performance audits of the OAG contribute to improvements   .324 .734 
N=215 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
Method for treating missing values: Replace with mean 
 
The estimate of the first factor, used in H11, measures what influence the auditees had in the 
audit process and the extent to which they agreed with the auditors’ criteria. The estimate of 
the second factor used in H3 measures the perception of the reports quality in terms of the 
auditees’ opinion of methodology, quality and assessments of the report.  These factors are 
not objective criteria, but are based on the audited civil servants’ own assessment. Quality can 
be assessed in a number of ways. The auditors use standards, peer reviews and external 
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reviews to assess quality. In recent years, however, greater attention has been given to the 
expectations of users, as opposed to more traditional interpretations of quality (Wilkins and 
Boyle 2011). The estimate of the third factor used in H5 measures the auditees’ opinion of 
how the performance audit report contributed to positive changes and improvements in their’ 
organization.
 
The fourth factor used in H2 measures the auditees’ opinion of the NOAG as an 
institution: whether it contributes to improvement, transparency and fraud prevention. 
 
The background variable used in the regression analysis was the variable “administrative 
level’. This variable was used in H4 and H8. Furthermore the variables, “The media showed 
an interest in the performance audit’, “The ministry and/or the government were put under 
pressure from political opponents as a consequence of the media interest’, “The performance 
audit has been used to further different actors’ interests’ were used in H9, H6 and H10. “It 
contributed to changes that the Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs 
demanded measures as a response to the performance audit’ was used in H7. 
 
The dependent variables: different dimensions of impact 
The performance audit reports issued by the NOAG serve two purposes. One is to hold 
ministries and agencies accountable for their administrative actions and the other is to 
contribute to improvement in the audited entities. The improvement dimension has recently 
been further stressed with the adoption of new international standards from The International 
Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI 2011), which operates as an umbrella 
organization for the external government audit community. Two variables make up the 
measure of impact of the performance audit in this study: how the respondents perceived that 
the audit was used to hold the ministry and agencies accountable for their actions, and how 
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the respondents perceived that the performance audit was useful, that is, contributed towards 
improvement. These two variables reflect the two main objectives of performance audit. 
The analysis revealed that 57 per cent of the audited civil servants found the performance 
audit useful to a large or a very large extent, whereas only 20 per cent found it useful to a little 
or very little extent (see the table 2). 
Table 2.  To what extent did you experience that the performance audit was useful/ used 
to hold the minister to account (per cent) 
 Useful Used to hold to account 
To a little or very little extent 20 47 
Not little nor large 24 20 
To a large or very large extent 57 34 
 Total 100 100 
Total N 213 172 
 
Table 2 also shows that only 34 per cent of the respondents answered that the performance 
audit was used to hold the minister accountable to a large or very large extent. More 
respondents, 47 per cent, answered that the performance audit was used to hold the minister 
accountable to a little or very little extent. The non-significant correlation of 0.07 indicates 
that the variables of usefulness and accountability are unrelated. There is therefore no 
tendency for civil servants to think of reports used for accountability purposes as less helpful. 
Thus H4 has to be rejected. 
Several audit and evaluation researchers argue that the improvement and accountability 
purposes are at odds and may be incompatible (Armytage 2011; Poulsen 2009; Reichborn-
Kjennerud and Johnsen 2011). The evidence from this research, on the contrary, indicates that 
there is no such accountability paradox.  
Next is an analysis of how the independent variables may explain variation in the two 
dependent variables. 
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Multivariate analysis 
This section analyses how the scores on the different independent perception and background 
variables correlate with the dependent variables. I first examined the bivariate relations 
between the independent variables and the dependent variables. After the bivariate analysis, I 
performed two regression analyses. I did one regression analysis for each dependent variable. 
Independent perception and background variables from the bivariate analyses were selected 
into the regression analyses based on the hypotheses, the significance and strength of the 
relations. If independent variables correlated more than 0.60 (colinearity), one of them was 
removed from the regression analysis.  
 
Table 3 Multiple regression of perceived usefulness of performance audits 
 
  
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig.                          Beta 
 
Administrative level -.009 -.199 .843 
Influencing and agreeing with the NOAG (factor 
score 1) 
.369 8.894 .000** 
Quality of the report (factor score 2) .407 9.732 .000** 
Learning and improving from performance audit 
(factor score 3) 
.521 12.716 .000** 
Positive attitude towards the NOAG (factor score 
4) 
.243 7.186 .000** 
N=215 
Adjusted R2=0,656 
F Statistics=82,586 
Significance of F = 0,000 
Notes: **Significant at the 0,01-level; *significant at the 0,05 level 
The variable “administrative level” is dichotomized.  1 stands for civil servants in the ministries and 0 stands for 
subordinate entities. 
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Table 3 demonstrates that the independent perception variables were most important in 
explaining the helpfulness of the performance audit. H11, associated with the audited civil 
servants’ influence and agreement with criteria, was supported, indicating that institutional 
explanations contribute to the understanding of the helpfulness of performance audit. H3 on 
the auditees’ perception of the report, H5 on the auditees’ experience with the performance 
audit and H2 on the auditees’ perception of the NOAG were also supported. This indicates 
that the rational-instrumental perspective also matters in understanding the helpfulness of 
performance audit. The first hypothesis, H4– that the civil servants in the ministries would 
think of performance audit as more helpful – was rejected, indicating that the auditees 
administrative level does not matter when controlled for these perception variables. 
Table 4 Multiple regression of civil servants’ perception of the performance audits’ 
influence on holding the minister accountable  
 
  
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Beta 
 
Administrative level .171 3.263 .000** 
The performance audit has been used to 
further different actors interests 
.152 2.669 .008** 
The media showed an interest in the 
performance audit 
.187 3.106 .002** 
The ministry and/or the government 
administration were put under pressure from 
political opponents as a consequence of the 
media interest 
.378 6.506 .000** 
The Committee demanded measures  .211 3.971 .002** 
    
N=215 
Adjusted R2=0,420 
F Statistics = 31.992 
Significance of F=0,000 
Notes: **Significant at the 0,01-level; *significant at the 0,05 level 
The independent variables “Administrative level” is dichotomized.  “Administrative level”:1 stands for civil 
servants in the ministries and 0 stands for subordinate entities. “Work tasks”:1 stands for top executive, 2 stands 
for middle manager and 3 stands for caseworker 
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The rational-instrumental perspective was most important to understand whether reports were 
used to hold the minister to account. The regression analysis in table 4 indicates that the civil 
servants in the ministries tend to think that the performance audit was used to hold the 
minister to account more than subordinate entities did (H8). Hypotheses 6 and 7 concerning 
the politicians and the control committee’s importance in holding the minister to account were 
also supported. This worked through the media and then through pressure from political 
opponents, but also through demands from the Committee. The institutional hypotheses, 9 and 
10, on the media and the use of reports to further different actors’ interests was also 
supported. The relation was less strong, but still indicates that institutional processes of social 
accountability are at work. See table 5 for a summary of the hypotheses and results. 
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Table 5. The hypotheses and the empirical support 
 
Hypotheses Support 
A
cc
o
n
ta
b
il
it
y
 
v
er
su
s 
u
se
fu
ln
es
s 
H1: The auditees will perceive performance audit as less useful when the 
reports are used to hold ministers accountable 
No 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l-
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
l 
H2 Whether the audited civil servants think of the performance audit as 
useful will depend on their perception of the SAI in contributing to 
transparency, improvements and prevention of fraud. 
 
Yes 
H3: The more positive perception the civil servants have of the quality of the 
performance audit report, the more they will think of it as useful 
Yes 
H4: The civil servants in the ministries will think performance audit is more 
useful than will those working in subordinate administrative levels 
No 
H5: Experiences with performance audit enhancing systems, policies and 
competencies will increase the audited civil servants’ perception of 
usefulness 
Yes 
H6: The more pressure from the politicians, the more the audited entities will 
feel that the minister is held accountable 
Yes 
H7: The more demands from the Standing Committee on Scrutiny and 
Constitutional Affairs, the more the audited entities will feel that the minister 
is held accountable 
Yes 
H8: Civil servants in the ministries will be more inclined to find that 
performance audit is used to hold the minister accountable than subordinate 
entities 
Yes 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
a
l 
H9: The more debate in the media, the more the audited entities will feel that 
the minister is held accountable. 
Yes 
H10: The more other actors are interested, the more the audited entities will 
feel that the minister is held accountable. 
Yes 
H11: The more the audited civil servants agreed with the NOAG’s audit 
criteria and the more they were allowed to influence the audit process, the 
more useful they perceived the performance audit to be  
Yes 
 
Discussion 
The analysis indicates that both rational-instrumental and institutional perspectives explain, 
albeit differently, the helpfulness of and the accountability from performance audit. 
Accountability mechanisms seem to work according to the rational-instrumental assumptions. 
The utility (and learning) dimension work according to both assumptions.  
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Prior research shows that the content of reports, the auditees’ perception and expectations of 
the performance audit and their communication with the auditors,  are important for the 
reports to be perceived as helpful (Alwardat 2010; Put 2011; Reichborn-Kjennerud and 
Johnsen 2011; Vanlandingham 2011). Van de Meer and De Vries (2000) also established that 
the impact of the SAIs depends on the audited civil servants’ agreement with conclusions. My 
research supports these findings. Both the content of the reports in terms of their perceived 
quality, clarity and methods, the auditees’ experience, as well as the report’s compatibility 
with the civil servants’ own perceptions of assessments and audit criteria all contribute 
towards explaining the degree to which the performance audits were considered helpful. 
These findings are also consistent with literature on knowledge and evaluation use (Amara et 
al. 2004). When controlled for these factors, administrative level did not matter. These factors 
are therefore more important than the location of the auditees’ place of work, whether in 
ministries or in subordinate entities.   See table 5 for hypotheses and empirical support. The 
analysis indicates that the audited institutions may be more inclined to use the reports if the 
institutional actors are convinced by the arguments of the NOAG. Responsiveness in the 
design and process of the performance audit is therefore important if the NOAG wants civil 
servants to perceive it, and its performance audits, as helpful. If the performance audit is 
perceived as helpful, the reports might be the starting point for a process of change.  
 
But can performance audit have an impact only if the auditees accept the criteria and 
conclusions of the SAIs?  My results indicate that this is not the case; Reactions from the 
control committee, the media and the politicians enhanced the tendency that ministers were 
held to account. Reports used to further different actor’s interests also reinforced this 
tendency. In addition, civil servants in the ministries were more aware of the accountability 
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dimension than other civil servants. At the same time the perception of usefulness was 
enhanced if the auditees thought of the SAI as an important institution in preventing fraud, 
promoting transparency and improvements. It follows that the auditees think the SAI supports 
desirable values and that it ensures trust in society, which is a prerequisite for a functioning 
system. The SAI thus has an impact both as a consequence of external pressure and as a 
consequence of its mere existence as a control body (Furubo 2011).  
 
One has to take into account that these findings are based on the audited civil servants’ 
perception of performance audit and not on actual behaviour. However, perceptions serve as 
frames for actions, rendering it more likely that certain behaviours are associated with certain 
patterns of perceptions (Egeberg and Trondal 2011, p. 874).  
 
In the literature, negative consequences of accountability are debated. Does holding to 
account lead to an overemphasis on critical findings in the reports and ultimately negative 
consequences in terms of improvement (Justesen and Skærbek 2010)? This research does not 
indicate that this would be the case. The findings actually show that accountability and utility 
are dissociated. Thus, reports used to hold to account are not perceived as less helpful. To 
grasp how the mechanisms of accountability actually work, a more extensive analysis based 
on additional data might nevertheless be needed. It would then be pertinent to ask how and for 
what the auditees are held to account, as this might influence their perception of helpfulness 
and the impact of performance audit (Bovens 2010; Justesen and Skærbek 2010; Power 
2003b). 
 
Morin’s (2001) research, based on the auditees’ opinions, indicates that the reports actually 
had a small, but perceptible impact on the audited organizations. My analysis confirms that a 
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majority of the auditees think the reports were useful. This might be a prerequisite for actual 
improvement to happen in organizations, but this article cannot conclude as to what concrete 
changes the reports contributed to. The actual product, which is the report, is only the point of 
departure for a possible change process. To grasp the actual impact of reports, research would 
need to encompass the content of the reports, the ensuing debate, and what actually happened 
in the wake of the publication of the reports. 
 
Conclusions 
The purpose of the performance audit is to contribute to learning and improvement. The 
reports are meant to be helpful to the government administration. Based on the assessments in 
the reports, the audited civil servants are expected to make changes and improve. At the same 
time, the performance audit is a tool designed to hold ministries and the government 
administration accountable for government spending and for results.  
 
This study has shown that the ministries and the government administration are perceived by 
civil servants to be held accountable to some extent, based on performance audit reports, but 
that this is largely not the case. As many as 57 per cent thought the reports were useful, 
whereas only 34 per cent claimed that the reports were used to hold to account. There was no 
correlation between the usefulness and accountability dimensions – the civil servants did not 
tend to think of reports used for accountability purposes as less useful, but neither did they 
think of them as more useful. Thus the findings reject the assumption of an accountability 
paradox, but it also rejects the assumption that accountability enhances performance, as the 
two variables are dissociated.  
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Civil servants in the ministries were most aware of the accountability dimension. The minister 
was held accountable by the media, political opponents, by the control committee and by 
actors furthering their own interests Also, when the auditees considered the SAI as an 
institution that furthered improvement and transparency, this enhanced the civil servants 
perception of the reports as useful. This indicates that pressure from relevant institutional 
actors contributes to the impact of the SAIs. 
 
Both rational-instrumental and institutional variables had a reinforcing effect on the audited 
civil servants’ perception of the helpfulness of performance audit. What mattered was that 
they were allowed to influence the performance audit process, that they had positive 
experiences from the process and that they agreed with the audit criteria and the assessments 
in the report. In addition, their perception of the quality of the reports was important. If they 
had a positive perception of it, they thought it was helpful.  
 
This article contributes to the literature on the impact of performance audit, but also to the 
wider discussions on performance management and the use of research and evaluation 
knowledge. It is especially relevant to evaluations with an accountability approach as it has 
explored the dilemmas between accountability and organizational learning. It has shown that 
involvement of the evaluated party, the quality of the report and agreement to assessments are 
important to perceptions of helpfulness. This does not necessarily run contrary to the 
accountability dimension. Holding to account also contributes to the impact of the evaluator, 
in this case the SAI. In addition, the article therefore also informs broader theories on how 
organizations cope with accountability and institutional pressures. 
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